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THE PHILIPPINE PROBLEM IN THE LIGHT OF
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL POLICY.

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
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**The Philippine Problem
in the Light of American
International Policy**

By ERNEST W. HUFFCUT.



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The Philippine Problem in the Light of American International Policy.

Huffcut, Ernest Wilson, 1860-1907.

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THE PHILIPPINE PROBLEM IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL POLICY.

The discussion of the Philippine problem has taken a wide range. The history of American expansion has been told and retold. The constitutional questions involved have been repeatedly expounded. The geographical, climatic, ethnological and commercial conditions of the islands have been often portrayed. Political philosophy and political prophesy have been freely expended. It would seem that little remains to be said that has not already been sufficiently emphasized.

There is, however, one phase of the question that I do not recollect to have seen independently treated. Most of the arguments thus far have been directed toward the internal effect upon the United States, or the internal effect upon the Philippines, of a permanent control and government of the archipelago by the American Republic. We have scarcely paused to consider the effect upon our external policy of the possession of a great Asiatic dependency. We have not yet had occasion to inquire whether a movement so sudden and so radical may have disturbed the relations of the United States to the other powers of the world so as to require us to re-examine and perhaps readjust our whole international policy. Yet such an inquiry will surely have to be made if we decide to enter upon the path of colonial empire outside the American continent. Heretofore our activities, our aspirations, and consequently our policies, have been distinctively, even exclusively, American. We have therefore been able to give to them a character wholly unique. Undisturbed by the rivalries and ambitions of the old world we have

framed our international policies on lines so simple and so well defined that they have never shifted with the changes of domestic politics or with the conclusions of European wars or diplomacy. Every party and every administration at home has accepted them and acted upon them as a fundamental and unquestioned part of our scheme of government. Every state abroad has respected them as the permanent expression of our unchangeable purpose. Never, I venture to think, has a great state, in the presence of states of equal power, been able to define and to maintain an international policy so simple, so exact, and withal so effective.

I may be permitted, at the risk of being elementary, to recall in set terms the formularies of American diplomacy.

The United States has had for its guide in international affairs two main maxims. The first was formulated by Washington in his farewell address, in these words:

"The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. * * * Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote, relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our

own, to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world."

The second was formulated by President Monroe, in his message of December, 1823, in these words:

"We owe it to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those (European) powers, to declare, that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration, and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling, in any other manner, their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

The policy enunciated by Washington is non-interference in, and non-entanglement with, the political concerns of Europe. The policy enunciated by Monroe, known as the Monroe Doctrine, is the non-interference by European powers in the political concerns of America. To the first we adhere by our own inaction. To the second we adhere by resisting the dangerous activity of European powers, as when we compelled the French to quit Mexico or when we persuaded Great Britain to arbitrate her title to territory claimed by Venezuela.

Guided by these two maxims our statesmen have steadily refused to unite with European powers in any political concert of action and have steadily refused to permit European powers to interfere with political affairs on this continent or its appurtenant islands. Like the Pope who divided the non-European world between Spain and Portugal, we have divided the whole

world politically between the United States and the European Powers, and have said, "we shall keep within our sphere of influence, do you keep likewise within yours." But unlike the Pope's mandate ours has been recognized and practically acquiesced in by the whole world. Our fidelity to our maxim of self-restraint has inspired a dread belief that we should be equally faithful to our maxim of resistance to European encroachment. Thus free from entangling international problems and free from foreign designs upon our own continent, we have been politically an American power, have seen one by one the European dependencies here become in their turn American states, until our only European neighbor of any consequence is our own mother country.

The primary maxim, enunciated by Washington, is not merely a warning against "entanglements" with foreign nations or a prohibition against alliances; it is a restraint upon even that concert of action which is, or has been, so common a phenomenon in European international affairs. The reason for such restraint lies in the happy geographical situation of the United States. In Europe, or Asia, or Africa, no one nation is dominant. In Europe the 'six great powers' has come to be a familiar phrase signifying that Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France, Austria and Italy must each be reckoned with in any question affecting the international politics of the old world. The other European states do not count. Their destiny is in the hands of the six great powers. All that saves some of them from extinction is the impossibility of a concert of action by the six. No one is allowed to disturb the balance of power by aggressions or annexations. The Turkish Empire exists because no concert of the six powers can be had looking to its dissolution. New states, like Roumania or Montenegro may be carved out and neutralized but no additions can be made to the existing territory of any of the six at the expense of the smaller states. In Africa each of the powers is allowed to work its will, and that great continent has practically been divided almost within our own day. In Asia the same system that has subdivided Africa is at work, and is eating up the Chinese Empire. Eventually we

may expect to see the colonizing powers—Great Britain, Russia, Germany and France—come to some understanding for the government of inter-colonial problems in Asia in much the same way as they have clumsily managed to treat international problems in Europe. In Africa, Great Britain and Germany and France must in the same way act in concert in order to keep the peace.

The striking phenomenon in all this is the fact that no one power is dominant, that in its every movement each power is closely watched by jealous neighbors and often checked in its plans or thwarted of its prize.

On the American continent, however, the situation is strikingly different. Here no concert of action is necessary or permissible. The United States is the paramount power and by its sole will decides in the last resort all strictly American questions to the exclusion of all European interference or influence. The United States is the great neutral nation of the world, and it is so because it is remote in space from the other great powers, remote in interests from the other great powers, and dominant in its own hemisphere. In order to remain thus free to act as its own interests may at any particular time dictate, it keeps clear of all entangling alliances and has until very recently kept clear of all extra-American contact with European, or old world, questions or interests.

We have even refrained from acting in cases where our sympathies were enlisted in behalf of oppressed peoples or of progressive movements. Thus the heroic struggle of the Greeks for independence from Turkish rule enlisted the liveliest sympathies of our people. Resolutions in favor of extending official sympathy or encouragement to them were, however, defeated in Congress, and our government declined to join Great Britain, France and Russia in the intervention in their behalf. The struggle of Hungary for independence in like manner aroused our sympathies, and even led us finally to offer free transportation to the United States to Kossuth and his compatriots who had escaped into Turkey. But there was no intervention, and the address of President Fillmore to the illustrious exile upon

his presentation to the President was so explicit upon this point as to give great offence to that unhappy but most erratic visitor. So staunch, indeed, has been our adherence to the traditional policy that we even declined to become a party to the international agreement for the establishment and government of the Free Congo State. And yet so ancient does all this sound in some ears, that there are not now wanting American citizens who deplore that we did not enter the scramble for the possession of African Empire!

Of actual "entangling alliances" there have been, aside from the one with France when she came to our aid in the struggle for independence, but two. The first is the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by which we agreed upon a concert of action with Great Britain in connection with an inter-oceanic canal. That we have repented this no one can deny. There is now pending a treaty intended to remedy the worst features of that diplomatic blunder, but it is in danger of failing because it does not go far enough toward extricating us from an embarrassing partnership. It would seem that the vexations and dangers we have suffered in consequence of this departure from our cardinal policy ought to be warning enough against any further deviations from the teachings of the fathers. The second alliance with European powers which was both a departure from our diplomatic maxim, and a vexatious blunder, was the tripartite arrangement for the government or control of Samoa. Here we were at once outside our proper sphere of influence—the American Continent—and outside our fixed international policy. Fortunately a recent treaty has dissolved the unhappy partnership, and has left us sole owner of a suitable naval station. Could we honorably denounce the Clayton-Bulwer treaty we should now be free from every alliance or partnership with European powers.*

Thus for a century the wisdom of Washington's diplomatic doctrine has been recognized and acted upon by every succeeding administration. We have twice departed from it, and twice

*Since the above was written the Hay-Pauncefote treaty has happily extricated us from this grave embarrassment.

repented the departure. We are now face to face with the issue whether we shall not merely depart from it as a temporary expedient, but practically abandon it altogether in favor of a dazzling dream of world empire.

The second maxim, embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, has equally been a consistent guide in all international questions pertaining to the American continent. It originated in a well-grounded fear that the European powers, or some of them, would intervene to aid Spain in subjugating her American colonies which had in whole or in part achieved their independence. It was a firm, unequivocal announcement that the United States would view such an intervention as a menace to its own safety and welfare. It effected its purpose. All thought of sending European forces to America was abandoned and the Spanish colonies one by one became free American States.

The national policy thus begun has never since been seriously questioned. It has, indeed, been rather confirmed and strengthened. A few illustrations of its application must suffice. Cuba presents the most interesting example. It was in October, 1823, before President Monroe had sent in the now famous message, that Jefferson then in retirement at Monticello, wrote to Monroe (who had asked his advice upon the promulgation of the doctrine) as follows:

"The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark upon it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe: our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs."

Having thus formulated with his usual felicity of expression the maxims of American diplomacy, Jefferson goes on to ask whether we wish to acquire for ourselves any one or more of the Spanish-American provinces. To this he answers:

"I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states. The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well-being."

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, in instructions to the American Minister in April, 1823, (eight months before the message), had said that "looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself," and that, "the question both of our right and of our power to prevent its transfer to another European power, if necessary by force, already obtrudes itself upon our councils."

In 1825, Mr. Clay, Secretary of State, instructed our Ministers in Europe to announce, "that the United States, for themselves, desired no change in the political conditions of Cuba; that they were satisfied that it should remain open as it now is to their commerce, but that they could not with indifference see it passing from Spain to any other European power." A little later he wrote: "You will now add that we could not consent to the occupation of those islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever."

In 1840, Mr. Forsyth, Secretary of State, wrote to our Minister in Spain:

"The United States will resist at every hazard an attempt of any foreign power to wrest Cuba from Spain. You are authorized to assure the Spanish government that in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it."

In 1852, Webster wrote to our Minister in Great Britain:

"The government of the United States could not be expected to acquiesce in the cession of Cuba to any European power."

In 1853, Marcy, Secretary of State, wrote to our Minister in Great Britain:

"The United States will never consent to its transfer to any other foreign power."

Succeeding Secretaries of State reiterated these sentiments whenever the occasion seemed opportune.

Thus from 1823 to the outbreak of the late war with Spain it had been our settled policy to prevent at all hazards the island of Cuba from falling into the possession of any other European power than Spain, and, except during the period of the slavery agitation, our statesmen were almost unanimously in favor of its ultimate annexation to the United States.

Other American territory has been regarded in like manner as not subject to European aggression. We drove the French out of Mexico where they had during our Civil War attempted to overthrow the Mexican Republic and to establish on its ruins a European monarchy. In like manner we resisted the aggression of Great Britain upon Venezuela and went almost to the verge of war in behalf of our cherished policy.

Whenever our interests warranted we have also sought by purchase to relieve American territory of European rule and control. It was this motive, far more than any supposed need to extend our own territory, that led to the purchase of Louisiana by Jefferson, of Florida by Monroe guided by John Quincy Adams, and of Alaska by Seward. It has been our uniform policy to get rid of European neighbors on this continent as fast as circumstances would warrant. Seward sought to purchase the Danish West Indies and failed only because President Johnson was in a constant quarrel with congress, and congress, in a spirit of retaliatory hostility, wished to thwart him.

Even the Hawaiian Islands, remote though they are from our continent, were declared to be within the purview of the Monroe

Doctrine and we announced as early as 1842 that we could not permit any European power to take possession of them.

Thus the whole American continent and the appurtenant islands have been in a sense forbidden ground to European powers. We have firmly and successfully maintained the integrity of our policy that European powers should neither colonize American territory nor interfere in any way with existing American governments.

We have gone farther and in the language of President Grant declared boldly that we look forward to the time when all American dependencies of European powers shall become independent states and that in the meantime, "these dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European power to another." (1st Ann. Message, 1869).

In a word, we have by force of our power and resources maintained for ourselves a primacy upon this continent which has enabled us to fix its relations with the old world and to impose our will as the sole arbiter of American international affairs.

We are now, however, suddenly confronted with new conditions and new problems that require us to re-examine our fundamental maxims of international policy and perhaps to revise them. The time foretold by scores of our statesmen when the Cuban question would surely compel the United States to intervene in its own interests in the affairs of that island, came at last. It resulted, as had been foreboded, in a war with Spain which ended with her expulsion from this continent. But it resulted also in what no statesman had ever foreseen or dreamed of—our propulsion into the other continent.

On May 1st, 1898, Dewey sank the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. An army of occupation was sent to take the city. A treaty of peace gave us the sovereignty of the Philippine archipelago. Our frontiers were extended until we faced as near neighbors in those waters, not merely the Asiatic powers, China and Japan, but the great European powers, Great Britain, Russia, Germany and France, the six greatest powers of the old world.

We faced them, moreover, at a moment in the history of the world when international rivalries were keenest, and international politics most complicated and dangerous.

Japan, victorious in her war with China, had been balked of her coveted prize by Russia, who took to herself the harbors and territories Japan had won and exacted. Great Britain, to preserve the balance of Asiatic influence, took to herself yet other harbors and territory. Germany made good her claim to others. France extended her Asiatic frontiers. And China, with oriental fatalism, kept what she could and looked inland toward her uncounted millions of subjects and outward toward her late foe, Japan, as instruments of future retribution and restoration. And any day Russia or Germany or France or England may demand yet more, will surely demand yet more, and China or Japan or one of the European civilizers, or two or more of them, may resist the demand, and then will come a welter of political entanglement or an appeal to force and arms.

Meanwhile can the United States, in its new island possessions, Asiatic in population and instinct and interest, hold aloof from the inevitable conflict? Already it has sought and received assurances as to the trade relations it may hope to maintain with China—not from China, but from the European powers who seem to have taken China's destiny into their own hands. But what if in the rapid march of events new conditions demand new measures? At present the United States relies upon the rivalries and jealousies of the European powers in Asia to subserve her own interests. But will they continue? What if the great mammoth nation of the north, girdled now with its trans-Siberian railway connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific, dotted with its rising iron-works, factories and ship yards, straining like an awakening giant to stretch his limbs, should push down over the Siberian plains into the Chinese Empire and proclaim Russian supremacy by uniting the two greatest Asiatic races into one political power? Could all the world resist the union and its consequences? If it could, would it not be at a sacrifice undreamed of in all the imaginings of men?

And where then would the United States stand in that struggle? Could we be indifferent spectators? Could we face it across a few hundred miles of sea as unmoved as if the Pacific rolled between it and us?

These are the new problems that are forced upon us by the battle of Manila and the treaty of Paris.

I do not now care to speak of the internal problems of the government of the Philippines, of the controversy over our moral right to hold and govern them, of the large question of the form in which we should govern them if we govern them at all; I wish to speak only of the international aspects of the policy of taking, holding and governing Asiatic territory and Asiatic people.

It must be remembered that save for the Philippines we have never taken any territory (except for naval harbors) outside of that sphere covered by our own Monroe Doctrine. Our anomalous interests in Samoa were perhaps an exception, but we long since repented of that experiment and have very recently escaped from it by accepting an island or two, valuable only for naval purposes, as our separate share of the partnership assets. We may therefore be said to have confined our expansion within American territory. Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii we have long contended were within the Monroe Doctrine and we have repeatedly warned European powers that Cuba and Porto Rico could not be transferred from Spain to any other European power and that Hawaii could not be taken by any European power. In annexing Porto Rico and Hawaii, and assuming control of the destiny of Cuba we have therefore been entirely consistent with our traditions and policy.

From that tradition and policy we have now departed in assuming sovereignty over the Philippines. We have passed beyond the sphere of influence which we had marked out for ourselves and have engaged with the European powers in the scramble for Asiatic spoils. What effect is this to have upon our fu-

ture international relations? What effect is it to have upon our traditional diplomatic policy?

As yet, of course, we have made no change except the change in conditions. There are no new entangling alliances. There are no attempts at European aggression upon our continent. All remains as it was except that the United States has gone outside the American hemisphere, has become an Asiatic power, has projected itself into the arena of European political activities, interests and rivalries. In the cant phrase of the day we have become "a world power" in place of being merely an American power. If the contention of some interpreters of our constitution be correct and that document extends over all territory belonging to the United States, (which I do not believe) we must rename ourselves "The United States of America and Asia."

Changed conditions mean, or may mean, changed policies. What could safely and consistently be adhered to by an American power may prove unsafe or inconsistent for an Asiatic power. What is wise and dignified for a primate may be thought intolerable arrogance in an equal. In Asia the United States is in the presence of four European and two Asiatic states whose interests are greater and of longer standing than hers, whose external policies are less restricted by domestic conditions, whose mutual relations are intricate and often secret, and whose territorial ambitions and aspirations are practically unbounded. The United States is in Asia moreover at a period in the world's history unexampled for the intensity of land hunger, a period which has seen the occupation and division of practically the whole of Africa and is seeing the rapid occupation and division of Asia. It is an appetite that grows by what it feeds on. Will the United States in Asia acquire the appetite? Shall we be content with an archipelago of a thousand isles or shall we, before it is too late, strike boldly for a port on the mainland, for a territory tributary to it, for a vast continental "sphere of influence" even to the remotest hinterland?

Whether we rest content with our archipelago or reach for more, can we hope to keep clear of some "entangling alliances?"

No states that have engaged in similar enterprises under similar conditions have ever found it possible to live peaceably with equally enterprising neighbors without some system of mutual checks and balances. What our Federal Constitution is to our states, such "alliances," or such "concert of action" must be for powerful neighboring nations. All European history is filled with examples of this. Are we destined to blaze out a new way and to succeed alone where the most experienced European states have felt obliged to resort to understandings, alliances and secret treaties?

If, then, our permanent possession of the Philippines will mean a marked departure from the maxim enunciated by Washington and followed with fidelity by his successors, we may properly—nay, must rightfully—examine the question whether we are prepared openly and deliberately to reverse our century-old policy and to embark upon new and untried courses. I am aware that there are those entitled to great respect who do not shrink from such a result. It is argued that we have grown from a small and struggling state into a great and powerful nation; that the reasons that led our fathers to avoid contact with European embroilments no longer exist; that, in a word, we are a "world power" and ought to conduct ourselves as such.

Perhaps this is true. Perhaps it is also true that what has enabled us to become great and powerful has been in large part our strict adherence to the homely maxim of minding our own business. At all events a policy which has kept us out of the vortex of international complications is one not lightly to be discarded in the flush of a new found or newly realized strength. Nations, no more than men, need invite trouble merely because they feel themselves strong enough to meet it.

In any event we ought not to decide to become and to remain an Asiatic power without a full consideration of the effect of such a step upon our relations with European nations. The present happy relations between the United States and Great Britain have lulled us into a sense of security. The dream of Anglo-Saxon world domination has taken possession of our

imagination. But an era of good feeling ought not to be an era of bad statesmanship. "Put not your trust in princes." Another Venezuelan incident, an Alaskan boundary dispute, an inter-oceanic canal complication, may dissipate in a day all the good understanding of years. The need of support in Asia may even compel us to abandon an advantage or a policy in America. Up to the present our political interests have been exclusively American, and we could defend them unembarrassed by any thought of the effect upon other political interests in the old world. With an Asiatic dependency we may be compelled to consider the effect in Asia of an Anglo-American or Anglo-German dispute in America. Insensibly, without any formal treaties of alliance, we may be drawn by necessity into entangling relations with old world powers which it has been our good fortune so far to escape.

It is in its reflex upon our cherished Monroe Doctrine, however, that the scheme of Asiatic Empire seems most likely to threaten our fundamental dogmas. Up to yesterday we had a consistent and well-ordered international policy. It was conceived in such a spirit of national self-interest that every party and every president has accepted it as an unquestioned part of our national creed. Between certain pretty well defined longitudes we claimed and exercised sole domination. Within that vast area, greater in extent than that over which any other nation ever claimed like dominion, the will of the United States was paramount and controlling. Our sphere of influence was a continent. Our will ran as international law over a full half of the habitable globe. Outside of that sphere of influence we did not obtrude; within it we did not permit other powers to intrude. The two policies were correlative. The old world for old-world powers; the new world for the new-world power. Such were our professions; such were our practices.

But if we do not respect our own policies can we expect others to do so? If we obtrude into the affairs of the old world can we consistently or rightfully claim to forbid old world powers to interfere in the affairs of America? If we pass outside the sphere we had marked out for ourselves can we expect that others will

not trespass upon our sphere? Can we abandon half our international policy and hope to keep the other half uninjured?

It must be remembered that at the bottom our Monroe Doctrine is based on the idea that to permit the extension of European territory on this continent would be dangerous to our peace and safety. In the furtherance of the policy we have sought whenever possible to secure the release of American territory from existing European ownership. In this we have succeeded to an extent that leaves practically but one thing to be desired. And yet, having from such a motive of safety freed ourselves from the presence of powerful and ambitious neighbors, we cross six thousand miles of water and settle down in proximity to the same unwelcome neighbors. How now shall we justify objecting to them as neighbors in America? If they are dangerous in America they are dangerous in Asia. If we may take an archipelago next door to them in Asia, why may they not take an archipelago next door to us in America? If we may buy the Philippines why may not Germany buy the Danish West Indies? As an exclusive American power we might justly claim the exclusive control of American affairs. As an Asiatic power we would do well to give and take, or, to follow the chronological order, to take and give.

We must not be blind to the fact that this question may soon be vital. Germany, of all the great powers, has not even a naval station in the new world. Yet Germany is fast becoming one of the foremost commercial nations of the world. Her trade with South America is large and increasing. Her subjects in Brazil and the Argentine Republic are numerous and their interests important. What England is doing in the Transvaal she may attempt in South America. Her ambitions keep pace with her power. She is ruled by a prince at once able and audacious. He has seen the United States about to abandon the half of its international policy and to render thereby the other half illogical and perhaps inexpedient. We are nearer to him in the Philippines than he would be to us in Brazil. On what ground shall we object if he sees fit to aid his subjects in South America to set up there a German dependency?

It is well known that Germany is ambitious to incorporate Holland into the German Empire. Should this ambition be realized Germany would succeed to immense colonial possessions, some of which are on this continent, some of which lie within a hundred and fifty miles of Porto Rico, and nearer to the proposed Nicaragua canal than any possession of the United States. Would Germany be a welcome neighbor in these waters. But welcome or not, is our title to object to such a transfer as clear as it would otherwise be if at the time the question arises we are already a voluntary neighbor of hers in Asiatic waters?

To sum up the whole situation, the United States has voluntarily become a party to the political problems of the old world; it is in a fair way to take the next step and become a party to the international compacts necessary to safeguard its Asiatic interests. It will then have abandoned the first half of its ancient international policy. It will at the same time and by the same act have rendered the second half illogical—perhaps impossible. Having stepped outside the circle which it itself drew it may find that another has entered the circle whose magic or power is thus destroyed. We should therefore be left with no settled international policy such as guided our predecessors. We should begin anew, and work out by painful experience another policy suited to our changed conditions. The experience of more than a hundred years would be lost. The revolution would be almost as complete as that which attends a radical change in internal governmental policies.

It seems proper, therefore, that we should view the Philippine problem in the light of our international policy. To put it boldly, we may ask, shall we keep the Philippines and give up our international policy, or shall we keep the policy and give up the Philippines? It is mainly a question of self-interest as are most questions of statecraft. Which in the long run is more likely to prove of the greater value, sole and paramount authority in America or a partial authority in America and Asia? Shall we rule one continent or divide the rule of two?

I do not undertake to say that to ask these questions is to answer them. Much, doubtless, may be wisely said on either side. I merely wish to emphasize what appears to me to have been generally overlooked, that these questions are involved and that they will be answered when the decision is made whether we shall retain permanently a great Asiatic dependency.

Whatever the answer may be—whether we decide to remain in the paths blazed out for us by the fathers or to depart from them and make new ways for ourselves and our posterity—I have an abiding confidence that the American people will prove equal to any task it undertakes and will preserve unshaken the foundations of representative popular government.

I do not wish to contend, as some are wont to do, that the government of an Asiatic dependency peopled by eight millions of orientals in various stages of development from savagery to civilization, is destructive of the republican idea upon which our institutions are founded. On the contrary, I hold that it is a palpable distortion of the generalizations of the Declaration of Independence to attempt to apply them to this problem. That document is not a statute nor a constitution, but a declaration by Englishmen of the English doctrine, applicable to English peoples. Its author evidenced by his subsequent official acts the interpretation which he put upon it. Our history and English history show alike that the saving grace of common sense is superior to any document or any theory. If we are to govern the Philippines permanently or temporarily it must be by a common sense system suited to their conditions and needs, and not by a system framed for the heirs of ten centuries of experience in self-government. In this I see nothing dangerous to our own institutions, or antagonistic to them. During the period in which England has taken to herself the government of many millions of orientals, and has governed them without the aid of the British constitution, she has passed from an aristocracy to a democracy, and her people enjoy to-day a larger measure of self-government than ever before in all her history.

If it shall be the duty or the fate of the United States to gov-

ern the Philippines, I believe we shall compass the task with advantage to them and without injury to our own institutions. That we shall make mistakes goes without saying. We are novices at the work, and must learn by experience. But our history does not bid us despair. What our own kith and kin have done in India we can do in the Philippines, if we must.

Neither do I think that we are acting contrary to good morals in undertaking such a mission. We are the guardians of a people in the infancy of statehood. What would be immoral would be to turn them adrift to fall a prey to their own unregulated instincts, or to the rapacity of others. That we have become responsible for their future no one can deny. That responsibility we can not shirk. I believe no American wishes us to shirk it. Whether we were wise in assuming the responsibility it is now fruitless to inquire. Having assumed it we must discharge it, or stand condemned and ashamed in the face of the civilized world.

But guardianship is not a permanent but a temporary office. It ceases when the ward is deemed competent to manage his own affairs. It is therefore proper for us to inquire whether we desire to retire from the office whenever circumstances render such a course proper, or whether we desire to incorporate and adopt the ward into our own family. In deciding that question we may honorably consider our own interests—internal and external. As an internal question it merits our earnest thought, but it is not my purpose to enlarge upon that to-night. As an external question, I hope I have been able to show that it involves a radical, a revolutionary change in our whole diplomatic policy, that it means the departure from our position as an exclusively American power with all the security from international complications that this insures to us, that it means a severe blow to our Monroe doctrine, if not an enforced abandonment of it. That is a heavy price to pay for an Asiatic archipelago unsuited by climatic conditions for American colonization. Aside from the constitution which they framed for our internal security, the fathers left us no more precious legacy than the two maxims which they framed for our external security. They are interwoven with all the woof and warp of our na-

tional history. They have given us stability, security and repose in our international relations. No one can over-estimate in a government like ours, with its quickly changing domestic politics, the value of a fixed and definite international policy which all men of all parties adhere to as they adhere to the constitution itself. To be set adrift without chart or rudder on the tempestuous sea of international politics would be a calamity beyond calculation. I hope, I believe, that we shall not have such a calamity visited upon us. I hope and believe that with the sober second thought of the American people will come the invincible conviction that Washington's farewell address and Monroe's message are worth more to us as an American nation—as the dominant and paramount American nation—than all the unnumbered islands of the Pacific.

